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Making Sense of Jinnah Today : From EPW



Making Sense of Jinnah Today

It is high time we moved beyond seeing Partition largely along lines of religious affiliation with clear villains.


Jaswant Singh, former foreign minister of India and a long time leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party, has been summarily expelled from his party for writing a book on Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Jinnah: India-Partition-Independence, Rupa & Co, New Delhi, 2009), the founder of Pakistan. In this book, Singh appears to have argued that the intransigence of Congress leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel practically forced Jinnah to demand Partition of Britishruled India and the creation of a sovereign Pakistan. Singh terms him the leader of Muslims in undivided India and apparently argues that Jinnah was merely trying to protect his constituency from a Hindu majoritarian democracy. Apart from the extraordinary irony of such a statement coming from a senior leader of the very party which has aggressively pushed the Hindu majoritarian agenda, such a position also goes against a widespread national consensus over the historical assessment of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and his role in the creation of Pakistan. Whatever the other political and academic differences among the entire spectrum from the far left to the far right, Jinnah has been the universal villain of Partition in independent India’s historiography. While there may be substantial differences of opinion over the role of the Congress as a party and of individual Congress leaders in contributing to the Partition of the country, there has been unanimity over the destructive political role of Jinnah, especially in the last decade of British rule. Therefore, it is quite surprising and unexpected that the revision of this position has come, not once but twice in quick historical time, from political figures placed firmly in the far right of the Indian spectrum. In 2005, L K Advani had taken initial steps towards a similar reassessment of Jinnah. His comments calling Jinnah secular and praising his historical role could be explained away in two ways. One was the obvious, and perhaps superficial, explanation that he was being polite to his Pakistani hosts. But as the EPW columnist GPD wrote at that time, Advani calling Jinnah secular was merely a reflection of V D Savarkar’s Hindutva ideology, which claimed that once Hindus captured state power, they would treat the minorities with generosity. Jinnah, once he had acquired his Muslim state, was merely doing that by speaking of minority rights. It is instructive that these remained mere words in Pakistan and suggest that there was no contradiction in Advani applauding Jinnah, since he wanted India to be a similar polity. At most, Advani could be accused of making a tactical mistake but did not renounce any foundational idea of Hindutva. This was perhaps the reason why Advani got off with a mere rap on the knuckles. Jaswant Singh, it appears, forwards an argument which is a break from the Hindutva position. He suggests that Muslims were right to fear domination and discrimination in a Hindu majority India with universal suffrage and to demand special protections or rights. Further, he accuses Congress leaders, including Sardar Patel, of being complicit in the Partition. Therefore, it should have come as no surprise to anyone, least of all to a Hindutva veteran like Jaswant Singh that his party reacted with the fury it did. Jaswant Singh’s arguments are not novel. It is a well argued, and equally well contested, position in Indian historiography that, by the 1940s, Jinnah had emerged as the sole spokesman of the Muslims and that it was Nehru and Patel’s “intransigence” over devolution of powers from the union to the federating units, as well as their inability to accept checks on the absolute power of
the centre which pushed Jinnah to ask for a sovereign Pakistan. The controversy over Jaswant Singh’s book points to a little noticed dissonance in the way Jinnah’s legacy is seen in India and Pakistan. Unlike in India, where Jinnah remains universallyderided for entrenching communalism in the subcontinent, in Pakistan Jinnah’s legacy is the biggest political asset for the
liberal and left political forces to fight the fundamentalists. The very words promising political rights to the minorities, which form part of Jinnah’s speech to Pakistan’s constituent assembly in August 1947 and which were quoted by Advani and Jaswant Singh in his praise, are used by those in present day Pakistan who want to push back the fundamentalist forces and work for
a democratic state and tolerant society there. It is not Jinnah’s earlier record of working for Hindu-Muslim unity but rather, his post independence avatar which is the preferred political asset for secularism and liberal democracy in Pakistan today. The same person’s legacy serves diametrically opposite political purposes in the two successor states of British India. In India he is a symbol of right reaction, while in Pakistan he is the bulwark for the present day Left. What does this dissonance imply? The easy answer is that political conditions are so starkly different in India and Pakistan that a stable constitutional majoritarian democracy would be an advance in Pakistan while it would be a political regression in India. But there is something more troubling that this dissonance points to. Even 62 years after the traumatic events of Partition the two successor states of British India have not been able to encourage a historiography and national memory which does not demonise and vilify the founding fathers of the other. This surely does not help either of the two countries to move on and build more secure relations; rather it helps entrench the deep distrust that the national publics of the two countries have for each other. While there cannot be any denial of Jinnah’s crucial role in asking for division, it surely should be possible to move beyond the monochromatic visions of Partition seen largely along lines of religious affiliation with clear villains. Jinnah, Nehru, Patel or even Gandhi, were not merely representing religious or national interests. Rather, as any social scientist would aver, class, caste and a variety of other interests played an equally crucial role. Not only academic rigour but the pressing political needs of building peace in the subcontinent call for a renewed public debate on Partition.

Trouble in Xinjiang



China’s minorities are signalling that they will not put up with policies that favour the Han majority.


China’s inability to offer its (non-Han) minorities an equal and fair stake has been revealed once again in the recent violence in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. If it was Tibet in 2008, it is Xinjiang in 2009. Neither event has shaken Chinese government and party control over the two provinces, but both have surely reminded the government and chinese Communist Party (CCP) that they cannot continue to stick their heads in the sand and pretend that there is no disaffection among the minorities. The conditions in Xinjiang were considered serious enough to compel President and CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao to embarrassingly cut short his participation in the G-8 meetings in Italy earlier this month.

Ethnic violence leading to the deaths of more than 190 people rocked Urumqi on 5 July, when rioters belonging to the predominantly Sunni Islamic Uyghur denomination attacked members
of the Han Chinese in the city. The immediate trigger for the incidents in Urumqi was the violent targeting of Uyghur migrants by Han workers in a factory in the southern Chinese province of
Guangdong on 26 June. Upset by what some Uyghurs felt as Chinese government inaction in bringing the guilty Han workers to justice, protests were staged in Urumqi. The public anger was
transformed into a bloody ethnic riot with Uyghurs attacking the migrant Han Chinese population.

The official reaction of the Chinese government was to blame external forces for these incidents, pointing fingers at a Uyghur separatist leader (of the World Uyghur Congress) based in the
United States. But just as in the Tibetan events last year, the riots in Urumqi must be attributed to resentment among the minority ethnic groups of China’s population against government policies. One such policy is the “Western development” initiative launched in the latter half of the 1990s, which involved the large-scale capital investment in utilisation and extraction of natural resources in an endeavour to economically develop the western regions of China. Simultaneously, there was also an influx of ethnic Han Chinese to partake in the economic benefits of the growth process in these regions, including Xinjiang, a process which the CCP has been silently pleased about since it alters the demographic composition and facilitates control over the minorities. The Han migrants have been able to garner a large share of the employment opportunities. This combined with measures such as teaching of Mandarin in schools in Xinjiang has not gone down well with the Uyghur-speaking people. Thus, despite certain concessions to minorities such as the relaxation of the One-Child policy or other social measures, resentment against Han inmigration, corruption among the ruling elite, lopsided development and perceptions of cultural suppression have seen Uyghurs increasingly turning antipathetic to the Chinese government. This resentment also resonates with the perception of rising inequality and government corruption elsewhere in China.

China’s constitution and its 1984 Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law on paper provide ethnic minorities the right to protect, preserve and promote their cultures. The provision for diversity in the constitution and in the autonomy law have not been translated into implementation in Xinjiang (and Tibet), giving rise to open expression of grievances. The Chinese government will be foolish if it persists with its policy of conflating all forms of Uyghur dissent and grievances within “separatism, extremism and terrorism” and if it refuses to adopt a far more commodative
approach basing itself on the stated aims of the constitution. Merely blaming the separatist elements in the Uyghur diaspora for “fomenting” the riots is not going to help resolve the situation.The danger of a Han chauvinist and nationalist reprisal and consequent repression of Xinjiang remains, but thus far the Chinese government, both at the national and at the local levels, has tried to restore normalcy by appealing for calm while bringing those engaged
in murder and violence to justice. The relative freedom and access given to the press (both local and foreign) in covering the events after the 5 July incidents suggests a marked change from the Chinese government response to the incidents in Tibet last year. Beyond the political measures, the CCP and the government have to revisit the capital-intensive growth paradigm which is yielding some benefits to the Han majority but seems to be yielding little to the Uyghurs.

source : Economic and Political Weekly